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RECENT CASE NOTES
in the foreign state is not a hardship, oppression, or fraud as will warrant
granting an injunction. Missouri-Kansas R. R. v. Ball, supra. It seems
clear, however, that the instant case is in harmony with the weight of
American authority. A. W. E.
INTOXICATING LIQuoR-PossEssIoN-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-CREDI-
BILITY OF WITNESSES-ORAL ARGUMENT-Appellant was convicted, after
trial, upon affidavit charging unlawful possession of liquor under Sec. 4,
Chap. 45, Acts 1925, Burns' Ann. St., Sec. 2717, and sentenced to serve
not less than one and not more than two years in the State Prison.
State's evidence, besides an agreed stipulation showing two prior con-
victions, consisted of the testimony of the arresting officer, that in search-
ing appellant's house he found two gallons of moonshine whiskey in a
hideout under a closet in a room occupied by appellant. Appellant denied
knowledge of the whiskey and testified that he had moved into that room
the dvy before, when it was vacated by Fennoff, who had occupied it
theretofore. Fennoff testified for appellant that he found the whiskey and
put it in the hideout. Appellant assigns as error the overruling of motion
for new trial based on the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the find-
ing of the court. Held: Affirmed. Malich v. State, Supreme Court of
Indiana, January 15, 1930, 169 N. E. 531.
The first question raised is what constitutes possession under the
statute. Branarn v. State, 165 N. E. 314, decides it means actual physical
control and that ownership and exclusive possession are not essential
elements, and that the possession must be conscious. The Indiana cases
so holding have been considering the statute covering possession with
intent to sell. This case involves the same elements of possession without
regard to intent or motive required under that statute. The cases from
other jurisdictions support the proposition that knowledge is an essential
element under statutes similar to the one in question. State v. Harris,
(Ore.) 211 Pac. 944; Nelson v. State, (Wis.) 203 N. W. 343, and State v.
Gates, (N. D.) 204 N. W. 350, in which an instruction, "that if liquor was
taken from a room vacated by a lodger and put in defendant's room with-
out his knowledge by his wife, that defendant would not be in possession,
but if that claim was believed to be a subterfuge and you are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew of its presence, then you
,will convict," was upheld. 33 Corp. Juris. 585 supports the principle that
knowledge is an essential element under a statute making possession alone
a crime.
Appellant put the question of knowledge in issue by his testimony and
that of Fennoff, in rebutting the acknowledged presumption of knowledge
arising from actual possession. In determining whether evidence was
sufficient to sustain a finding or verdict, only evidence favorabie to the
prevailing party can be considered with inferences and conclusions drawn
therefrom, and the court will not weigh the evidence. MeDonough V.
U. S., 299 Fed. 30; Sloan v. U. S., 287 Fed. 91; Moore v. State, (Ark.)
267 S. W. 769; State v. Brown, (Mo.) 198 S. W. 177; Dennison v. State,
191 Ind. 232; Bohan v. State, 194 Ind. 237; State v. Sullivan, (W. Va.)
47 S. E. 267; Rosenberg v. State, 192 Ind. 485. The inferences must be
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drawn from premises established by proof. Young v. State, 194 Ind. 221,
141 N. E. 309.
The state's evidence of knowledge consisted of actual possession as
shown by testimony of the arresting officer. The issue presented was
whether the presumption of knowledge was overcome by appellant. In
face of that the finding of the court must be taken to mean that the
testimony of appellant and Fennoff was discredited. The question of
credibility of witnesses is not open on appeal, and no new trial will be
granted generally, when case turns on the credibility of witnesses, even
though evidence was contradictory and might have authorized an opposite
finding of fact if testimony of appellant's witnesses had been believed.
16 Corp. Juris. 481; State v. Sullivan, (W. Va.) 47 S. E. 267; Goldman
v. U. S., 245 U. S. 474; Payne v. State, 194 Ind. 438. The reason for the
rule is that the trial court and jury have an opportunity to observe the
witness while the court of appeal does not. In this case, therefore, the
presumption of knowledge, in light of the finding, must be taken as
unrebutted, as it depended on the credibility of appellant and his witness
and was decided adversely to appellant and is not reviewable. That being
so, there was evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict.
Appellant requested oral argument, which was Uenied. Petition for
oral argument is governed by Rule 26, Rules of Supreme and Appellate
Courts of Indiana, which in substance provides that if petition is made
within time for filing briefs, the court will set it down for oral argument.
The line of Indiana decisions on that point hold that where appellant's
case is thoroughly briefed, his position clearly stated, with the questions
relating thereto, the petition for oral argument will be denied where noth-
ing can be gained thereby. Young v. State, 194 Ind. 221, 141 N. E. 309;
Parrett v. State, 159 N. E. 755; Allgaier v. State, 164 N. E. 315; Gale v.
State, 168 N. E. 241; Seeger v. State, 168 N. E. 577; Ewbank, Indiana
Criminal Law, p. 627.
H. N. F.
MOTION TO MAX MORE SPECIFIC-REs GESTAE--CONTINUANCE-PROOF
OF INSURANcE-Plaintiff filed a complaint in two paragraphs alleging that
defendant approached the car in which plaintiff's daughter was riding
in the same direction at a dangerous and reckless rate of speed and with-
out warning purposely, recklessly, and carelessly tried to pass such car
while it was on a narrow fill, and because of a curve in the road and dust
defendant did not have a clear view of the road for 500 feet when he
tried to pass, and as a result plaintiff's car was struck and thrown down
an embankment, causing the death of plaintiff's daughter. In the second
paragraph plaintiff alleged that defendant, in trying to pass plaintiff's
car, crowded in so far and forced plaintiff's car so far to the right as to
cause the car's wheels to slip off the embankment and cause the driver
to lose control while trying to regain the roadbed. Defendant's demurrer
and motion to make more specific were overruled and this is assigned as
error. There are three more assignments of error: (1) The court's
action in allowing plaintiff's attorney to comment on the fact that de-
fendant was injured; (2) the refusal of the court to discharge the jury
on the illness of a juror; (3) the admission of evidence- that, before the
